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I
t is a great pleasure to have the opportunity to meet all of you and to share
with you some of my thoughts on issues related to banking—what I like to
refer to as “banking policy” as distinct from monetary policy. When I ﬁrst
joined the Federal Reserve way back in 1970, I did research on banking issues,
and in fact my doctoral thesis had to do with banking policy. As time passed I
was drawn ever more heavily into the monetary policy area. But I have never
lost interest in banking issues, and my new role at our Bank obviously gives
me ample reason, to put it gently, once again to give this broad and challenging
area a very high priority in my personal work schedule.
My remarks this afternoon will summarize some of the conclusions I’ve
reached regarding major issues currently facing banks, bankers, and regulators.
First, I will say a little about the efﬁciency of bank regulation as it exists today,
how it should be evaluated, and how it might be improved. Second, I will look
at some of the trade-offs between the regulatory burden we’d all like to reduce,
on the one hand, and the scope of the federal safety net, on the other. Finally, I
will comment brieﬂy on consumer and community reinvestment issues, which
are receiving especially intense attention presently.
I begin with the fundamental idea that ﬁnancial system arrangements are
generally most efﬁcient if left to private choice. This is merely a corollary to the
well-known presumption in favor of unfettered competition in unconstrained
markets. The unique characteristics of banking and ﬁnance sometimes cause
people to lose sight of the applicability of this principle to these industries, but
the extraordinary recent innovations in banking and ﬁnancial markets should
convince skeptics of the power of a competitive ﬁnancial system, given the
chance, to seek and ﬁnd the most cost-effective means of intermediating be-
tween borrowers and lenders.
This article is adapted from an address by J. Alfred Broaddus, Jr., president of the Federal
Reserve Bank of Richmond, at the Bank’s Baltimore Branch on August 19, 1993. Jeffrey M.
Lacker, research ofﬁcer, contributed substantially to the article. The views expressed in the
article are the author’s and not necessarily those of the Federal Reserve System.
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1. REGULATORY EFFICIENCY
Banking is one of the most heavily regulated of all industries. To determine
the principles that ought to guide the design of banking regulation, we need
ﬁrst to ask why that regulation exists.
In my view, the strongest rationale for bank regulation derives from fed-
eral deposit insurance, discount window lending, and the Fed’s involvement in
the payments system. Together, these three activities are often referred to as
the “federal safety net,” but I ﬁnd it most useful to think of them as credit
enhancements provided by the federal government to the banking system. De-
posit insurance is a third-party guaranty, analogous to standby letters of credit,
private mortgage insurance, and other forms of credit insurance. Discount win-
dow lending is similar in many respects to a collateralized line of credit, and
the credit extension inherent in the Fed’s participation in the payments system
is basically a clearinghouse overdraft facility.
Private providers of similar credit enhancements generally restrict the port-
folio choice and risk-taking activities of recipients, since they recognize that
third-party commitments often give rise to problems of “moral hazard”—to
use a term coined in the insurance industry—which refers to the tendency of
insured entities to take greater risks than they otherwise would. So, too, I think
most people would agree that the government needs to constrain the portfolio
choice and risk-taking activities of banks in order to protect the federal safety
net from moral hazard.
A key point here, however, is that competition among private credit en-
hancement providers forces them to minimize the burden of the restrictions
they impose. If one provider offers a guaranty with signiﬁcantly more restric-
tive covenants than competitors offering the same guaranty, business is likely
to be slow. On the other hand, a provider offering a guaranty with insufﬁcient
restrictions on borrower activity is likely to lose money steadily over time
due to excessive risk taking by its customers. Competitive pressure ensures
that constraints on the activities of recipients are efﬁcient in the sense that
they tend toward the minimum burden on borrowers consistent with actuarial
soundness of the enhancement.
In my view, bank regulations should be efﬁcient in exactly the same sense:
that is, they should be just restrictive enough to protect the actuarial soundness
of the federal safety net. Again, on the one side, insufﬁcient restraint on bank
activities could subsidize excessive bank risk taking and impose an unaccept-
able cost on taxpayers, the ultimate provider of federal credit enhancements.
At the same time, however, excessive restraint on banking imposes needless
costs on our ﬁnancial system, increases the spread between borrowing costs
and depositor returns, and ultimately risks reducing economic growth.
From this perspective, some aspects of current bank regulation clearly are
ﬂawed and in need of revision. For example, remaining restrictions on interstate   
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banking almost certainly could be eliminated without endangering the safety
net. Indeed, a strong argument can be made that interstate banking would reduce
risk to the safety net by allowing improved diversiﬁcation of regional risks.
Certainly, one of the fundamental banking lessons of the last decade ought to
be the high risk of region-speciﬁc economic shocks to an industry that, for all
of the structural changes that have occurred, is still dominated by local and
regional institutions. It is regrettable that in the absence of federal legislation,
we are forced to await a long and cumbersome process of statutory revision
at the state level. Dismantling the existing barriers to interstate banking while
preserving the competitiveness of banking at the local level ought to continue
to be an important legislative priority.
Similarly, legislative restraints on bank entry into related ﬁnancial markets
are difﬁcult to justify. The Glass-Steagall Act erects barriers between banking
and commerce and between banking and securities markets. The barriers be-
tween banking and securities markets are said to be needed to prevent conﬂicts
of interest, but our basic supervisory process seems quite capable of policing
these—as it does now, for example, with trust departments—without the dra-
conian prohibitions of Glass-Steagall. These barriers are often rationalized as
risk-containment measures for the protection of the federal safety net, but, in
the case of securities market activities, research has failed to support this claim.
Fortunately, we have been able to ease some of these restraints at the regulatory
level, but clearing away anachronistic federal statutory constraints in this area
would make sense.
As I think you know, the Fed supports further relaxation of restrictions
on interstate banking and bank powers, and these reforms, of course, were
part of the Treasury Department’s comprehensive proposals that led eventu-
ally to the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 1991,
or “FDICIA,” as it is usually called. FDICIA was in large part a reaction
by Congress to the perception that regulatory restrictions on bank risk taking
were inadequate to protect the federal safety net. Regardless of whether that
perception is fully justiﬁed or not, many of the Act’s provisions, such as the
requirement of prompt corrective action in the case of undercapitalized insti-
tutions, strike me as sound public policy and important steps forward. Other
parts of the Act, however, failed to consider the costs of regulations that go
well beyond what is required to protect the deposit insurance funds. Section
132 of the Act, in particular, which requires federal banking agencies to set so-
called safety and soundness standards regarding operations, management, asset
quality, earnings, stock values, and even employee compensation, seems clearly
excessive. The actual language of this section is not much more speciﬁc than
this, but it appears to envision rigid, predetermined rules for banks’ internal
management arrangements, irrespective of an individual bank’s capital position.
Such rules are not generally found in privately provided credit enhancements
and, in my judgment, would constitute unnecessary, intrusive, and potentially    
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harmful micromanagement of any adequately capitalized bank. In short, Sec-
tion 132 appears to raise the burden of bank regulation beyond the minimum
level necessary to protect the federal safety net. The basic soundness of bank
management has always been an important focus of the examination process.
But it would be counterproductive to substitute mechanical formulas for the
considered judgment of seasoned examiners, just as it would be undesirable
to substitute mechanical credit approval rules for the considered judgment of
seasoned loan ofﬁcers.
With all of this in mind, let me just say that the Fed and the other federal
bank regulators are striving to fulﬁll the intent of the law as efﬁciently as
possible in implementing this section of the Act—in other words, with the
smallest possible burden on the ﬁnancial system. More generally—and some-
what ironically—another part of FDICIA, Section 221, directed the Federal
Financial Institutions Examination Council (FFIEC) to review all banking reg-
ulations to determine whether they impose unnecessary burdens on regulated
institutions and to make recommendations to reduce such burdens. The Fed and
the other agencies that comprise the Council have completed this review and
have already made a number of changes designed to reduce the burden of exist-
ing regulations. Beyond this, the Interagency Statement on Credit Availability
issued in March, 1993, attempts to target exemptions from documentation re-
quirements for better-capitalized institutions. This represents a step to build
on in improving the efﬁciency of banking regulations by applying regulations
more selectively to individual banks based on their capital.
All of these actions are constructive. It is important that regulations be
reﬁned on a continuing basis to improve their efﬁciency. There are limits,
however, to the improvements that can be made in the context of the cur-
rent statutory environment. In this regard, Federal Reserve Governor LaWare’s
suggestion—that an independent, nonpolitical commission be created and
charged with developing a legislative agenda that would deal with regulatory
burden in the broader context of the changing competitive condition of the
banking industry—seems to merit greater attention than it has received to date.
Some of you, recalling the legislative process that produced FDICIA, may
reasonably wonder whether a broad banking reform effort can ever succeed.
I don’t have an easy answer to that question, but I do believe that the effort
should be made and that an independent commission is a useful suggestion.
2. THE TRADE-OFF BETWEEN REGULATORY BURDEN
AND THE SCOPE OF THE SAFETY NET
While we must constantly strive for the least costly and most efﬁcient regula-
tions to support the existing safety net, we also face broader choices in banking
policy. Even if we were to achieve the least burdensome regulations consistent   
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with the actuarial soundness of the safety net as it exists today, as a society, we
might still conclude that the costs exceed the beneﬁts the safety net provides.
Further reductions in bank regulations could then be sought by reducing the
governmental credit enhancements the regulations are designed to protect—that
is, by reducing the extent of the federal safety net. Private providers of credit
enhancements typically allow less restrictive constraints for less extensive guar-
anties. For example, less onerous loan covenants are required of a borrower
with lower leverage. Similarly, if the federal safety net were scaled back, we
could reduce the regulatory burden on banks.
Two related and frequently overlooked provisions of FDICIA take im-
portant steps in this direction. First, FDICIA requires the FDIC to select the
least-cost method of resolving failed depository institutions and to document
its decision. This is important because least-cost failure resolution can reduce
the extent to which uninsured depositors are implicitly insured at a higher
cost to the insurance funds—in other words, it can limit the implicit scope
of deposit insurance and the safety net. Second, FDICIA contains provisions
designed to discourage Federal Reserve discount window lending to critically
undercapitalized institutions and in some circumstances it imposes losses on the
Fed in the event a borrower fails. These provisions seek to prevent discount
window loans from artiﬁcially prolonging an institution’s life and allowing
uninsured claimants to continue withdrawing their funds at the expense of the
FDIC. While these provisions have yet to be tested by the actual failure of a
large institution, they should work to limit the scope of the “too-big-to-fail”
doctrine and heighten the monitoring incentives of uninsured claimants, which
would strengthen the case for easing bank regulation, especially the Section
132 variety.
In my opinion, perhaps the most disappointing aspect of FDICIA was the
omission of any signiﬁcant reduction in explicit deposit insurance coverage.
A strong argument can be made that even apart from “too-big-to-fail,” the
coverage of federal deposit insurance is excessive from the standpoint of the
incentives it creates (and doesn’t create) among bank managers and bank cus-
tomers and the risk it presents to the deposit insurance fund and ultimately
the taxpayer. Reducing the extent of explicit deposit insurance coverage would
provide a compelling reason for signiﬁcant reductions in the regulatory burden
on banks.
Many bankers and others naturally consider suggestions to reduce deposit
insurance coverage dangerous because such a reduction might undermine pub-
lic conﬁdence in the banking system. Beyond this, many community bankers
worry that it would weaken their competitive position in the industry if vestiges
of “too-big-to-fail” remain in place.
These concerns are reasonable and understandable. After numerous in-
creases in coverage over many years, capped by the sharp rise from $40,000
to $100,000 per account in 1982, reversing course might indeed reduce public   
6 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
conﬁdence in the short run. My own view, however, is that public conﬁdence
and the competitive positions of all banks would be strengthened over the
longer pull, especially since the public is now much more conscious of the
hazards and risks associated with deposit insurance in the wake of the savings
and loan debacle. I believe the public is fully capable of understanding that
reducing deposit insurance coverage would reduce risk in the banking industry
by increasing (1) the degree to which depositors monitor the riskiness of in-
dividual banks and (2) self-regulation by the industry. I think it is very much
in the longer-term interest of all bankers, whether from large banks or small
ones, to help persuade the public of this view. The alternative is public demand
for still more costly and burdensome legislation and regulation to protect the
insurance fund. The latter seems to me to be clearly a bigger risk to the health
of the industry than the immediate reaction to scaling deposit insurance back.
Other critics may claim that reducing explicit deposit insurance coverage
would increase the risk of bank runs and panics like those of the 19th century.
While 19th-century American banking lacked deposit insurance, it also lacked a
central bank acting as lender of last resort. The Fed can prevent banking panics
by supplying liquidity promptly and generously through the discount window
and open market operations as the events surrounding the October 1987 stock
market crash convincingly demonstrated. Scaling back deposit insurance would
in no way diminish the ability of the Federal Reserve to stem ﬁnancial panics.
The reason I am making so much of the need to reduce explicit deposit
insurance coverage in one way or another is that I doubt very much that really
meaningful regulatory relief—relief you can feel—will occur in the absence
of such a reduction. Fortunately, some progress has been made in laying a
foundation for reducing coverage in the future. For example, the FDIC, as
mandated by FDICIA, recently completed a study of the feasibility of “track-
ing” the ownership of deposits by individuals across banks in order to gauge
the feasibility of restricting coverage to one account per depositor. This is an
important initiative, one I hope will be pursued. The FDIC has also studied the
feasibility of partially privatizing federal deposit insurance. The FDIC would
sell a portion of its deposit coverage in the private reinsurance market. This
sale, in turn, would establish a market price for the insurance and indicate
the restrictions private markets would impose on insured institutions. Also,
private insurers are now offering supplemental deposit insurance directly to
depositors. If such market arrangements prove viable, their availability might
make reductions in FDIC deposit insurance coverage more palatable.
Before leaving the subject of the federal safety net, let me turn brieﬂy to
banking policy and the Fed’s role in the payments system. Since its founding,
the Federal Reserve has played a central role in the nation’s payments sys-
tem, and that role encompasses extensions of credit as well as transactional
operations. Although it does not receive as much public attention as deposit
insurance, there has been a growing awareness in recent years of the importance   
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of Federal Reserve credit and implicit guaranties to the payments system.
This increased attention led initially to the introduction of speciﬁc regulatory
constraints on payments system users, such as net debit caps for institutions
participating in the Federal Reserve’s Fedwire electronic funds transfer system.
Further, under the Program for Payments System Risk Reduction, the Fed is
reexamining the terms for such credit. As you know, the Fed will soon introduce
a fee for daylight overdrafts in the reserve and clearing accounts of depository
institutions, which is designed to increase the reliance on market forces to
regulate the volume of intraday credit.
Payments system policy should continue to focus on the extent of the
explicit and implicit guaranties the Fed provides and to strive to make the con-
straints on participants appropriate to the scale of the guaranties. As in the case
of deposit insurance, ﬁnancial market efﬁciency might well be improved by a
more proscribed Fed credit exposure with consequently less encumbering regu-
latory constraints. The prospect of continued rapid technological advance in this
area of banking lends weight to this view. It would be unfortunate indeed if the
implementation of operationally more efﬁcient payments system arrangements
were stymied by regulatory schemes more appropriate to earlier technologies.
3. CONSUMER AND COMMUNITY AFFAIRS ISSUES
Let me turn ﬁnally to consumer and CRA issues. Obviously, no discussion of
public policy toward banks would be complete without consideration of this
increasingly important and, in some respects, contentious area. I can really
only scratch the surface here. Consumer and CRA regulations may be viewed
by some as a sort of quid pro quo for the beneﬁts banks receive from deposit
insurance and access to the discount window. Unlike basic safety and soundness
regulation and supervision, however, community and CRA regulations play no
direct role in protecting the safety net and therefore are not likely to be eased
in response to scaling back the safety net.
As I see it, consumer and CRA laws and regulations have two basic pur-
poses. First, consumer laws and regulations seek to ensure that lenders respect
the basic legal rights of consumers in credit transactions—and most importantly
that they not discriminate against particular prospective borrowers on the basis
of sex, race, age, and so forth. Secondly, CRA regulations aim at encouraging
and helping banks meet the credit needs of the communities in which they
operate, especially for housing and community development purposes and al-
ways, of course, within basic safety and soundness constraints. These are not
only reasonable but laudable objectives that reﬂect this nation’s most cherished
values. Few if any bankers dissent from these objectives.
There is, however, disagreement—and I think legitimate and understand-
able disagreement—regarding the detailed character of these regulations and the    
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way they are implemented in practice. Let me offer just a couple of comments
in this regard.
First, credit markets, including markets for bank credit, generally allocate
credit very efﬁciently among all creditworthy borrowers. With this in mind,
regulators, and also consumer and community reinvestment activists and leg-
islators, need to understand what you already understand all too well—that
unduly burdensome, intrusive, and costly consumer and community reinvest-
ment laws and regulations can well reduce the ﬂow of credit and increase
its costs unnecessarily to the very constituencies that activists, legislators, and
regulators are trying to protect and assist. This is an instance of what Fed Gover-
nor Larry Lindsey calls the Law of Unintended Consequences, and unintended
consequences are not at all unlikely in this area. The implication, of course, is a
need for regulatory—and also legislative—restraint: adding new consumer and
CRA laws and regulations only when there is a clear and compelling reason
to do so, minimizing their intrusiveness, and continuously reviewing existing
laws to ﬁnd ways to reduce the burden they impose.
The second point I want to make is simply that we at the Federal Reserve
Bank of Richmond want to do all we can to facilitate your compliance with
consumer and CRA regulations and reduce the burden they impose on you.
We see this as a fundamental regulatory obligation. I can guess how most
of you react to someone who tells you he’s from Washington and he’s here
to help you. At least I only have to say that I’m from Richmond and I’m
here to help you. In any case, we have an active consumer and commu-
nity affairs operation at our Bank that is separate from our examination staff.
Our consumer and community affairs staff analyze local economic conditions
across the District, with particular emphasis on the credit needs and develop-
ment opportunities of moderate- and low-income households and communities.
They offer speciﬁc and detailed information—both through conferences and in
published form—designed to assist you in your compliance efforts. I hope you
will take advantage of this assistance and let us know whenever we can be
helpful to you in this area.
4. CONCLUSION
To quickly summarize the main points I’ve tried to make: First, regulations
should be efﬁcient, and since protecting the safety net is one of the central
reasons for bank regulation, one way to promote regulatory efﬁciency is to
try to aim for the minimum regulatory burden consistent with maintaining
the actuarial soundness of the existing safety net. Second, there is a trade-off
between the scope of the safety net and the burden of even the most efﬁ-
cient regulatory system. Consequently, beyond some point, reducing regulatory
burden requires a reduction in the scope of the safety net and, in particular,  
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the coverage of the deposit insurance system. Finally, since consumer and CRA
regulations have objectives other than protecting the safety net, they must be
evaluated on different criteria. But activists who promote them, legislators who
enact them, and regulators who implement them should be keenly aware of
the Law of Unintended Consequences and the possibility that excessive zeal
ultimately may be counterproductive. Attention to these points, I believe, can
signiﬁcantly enhance the contribution that necessary banking regulation can
make to the economy’s strength and its ability to grow.